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Abstract
This paper explores the interactions between taxes on work-related traffic congestion
and pre-existing distortionary taxes in the labor market.  A congestion tax raises the overall
costs of commuting to work and discourages labor force participation at the margin, when
revenues are returned in lump-sum transfers.  We find that the resulting efficiency loss in the
labor market can be larger than the Pigouvian efficiency gains from internalizing the
congestion externality.  In contrast, if congestion tax revenues are used to reduce labor taxes
the net impact on labor supply is positive, and the efficiency gain in the labor market can raise
the overall welfare gains of the congestion tax by as much as 100 percent.  Recycling
congestion tax revenues in public transit subsidies produces a positive, but smaller, impact on
labor supply.
In short, our results indicate that the presence of pre-existing tax distortions, and the
form of revenue recycling, can crucially affect the magnitude, and possibly even the sign, of
the welfare effect of road-pricing schemes.  The efficiency gains from recycling congestion
tax revenues in other tax reductions can amount to several times the Pigouvian welfare gains
from congestion reduction.
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welfare effects
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1.   INTRODUCTION
Recent decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in the volume of road traffic and
associated delays due to congestion throughout the world.  In the United States total vehicle
miles traveled increased by 82 percent between 1969 and 1990.1  Traffic congestion imposes
substantial costs on society.  Schrank and Lomax (1996) estimated that the costs of travel
delays and additional fuel consumption due to congestion amounted to $51 billion for the
United States in 1993.  The problems of traffic congestion are likely to worsen in the future
with growing populations, real income, and labor force participation rates.  Thus, there is
mounting pressure for policies to reduce, or at least curb the growth of, traffic congestion.2
Clearly, it is important to understand the economic impacts of proposed measures, and
optimal amount of traffic restraint.
One approach to traffic restraint, often advocated by economists, is to require drivers
to pay more for road use during peak periods.  This policy represents a more direct, and hence
more efficient, way to reduce congestion externalities than other measures, such as parking
fees, gasoline taxes, subsidies for public transport, and high occupancy vehicle lanes.3
Moreover, the development of electronic collection devices has made road charges that vary
with traffic volumes over the course of the day easier to implement, and has reduced fears
about the government collecting information on peoples' driving habits.4
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1 From Statistical Abstract of the United States 1997, table 1015.
2 See e.g. The Economist, Dec 6, 1997 pp. 15-16.  The traditional response to roadway congestion has been to
build more roads, but despite considerable investment--expenditure on highway construction and maintenance
was $67 billion in 1994--this policy has failed to prevent major roads becoming more and more crowded.
Additional road capacity does not penalize drivers for adding to congestion and creates more demand for road
use in the long run (see Downs, 1992, for a lucid discussion).
3 These other policies do not optimally raise the cost of using congested roads relative to alternative non-
congested roads, or using the road during off-peak periods.  Hence they do not induce the most efficient
substitution away from the congested road onto alternative transport options.
4 At various points within a road system deductions can be made electronically from a pre-paid credit card
installed in vehicles.  The tag plate of the car is recorded only if there is insufficient credit on the card.
Previously, electronic schemes effectively followed each car through the road system and sent monthly bills to
car owners.  Electronic time of day pricing schemes have been implemented in Singapore, Norway's cities of
Oslo, Trondheim, and Bergen, and will come into effect in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, and The Hague inParry and Bento  RFF 99-45
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The theory of optimal congestion taxes, and how much to invest in additional road
capacity, was developed by Walters (1961), Vickrey (1963, 1968), Mohring (1965, 1970),
Strotz (1965), Kraus et al. (1976), and others.  The basic framework has been extended to
capture a variety of second-best considerations that arise from other externalities and pre-
existing policies within the transport system.  For example, Newbery (1988a, 1988b)
discusses accident and road damage externalities; Liu and McDonald (1998), Braid (1996),
and Verhoef et al. (1996) examine congestion taxes when congestion on competing routes
goes unpriced; Glaister and Lewis (1978) examine the interaction between public transit
subsidies and traffic congestion; and Small and Kazimi (1995) study the pollution costs of
vehicle travel.5
This paper contributes to the literature on second-best congestion taxes by exploring
interactions with pre-existing distortions outside the transportation sector, that are caused by
the tax system.  It builds on a growing body of analysis, mainly in environmental economics,
that has shown that the welfare effects of new regulations can critically depend on how these
policies interact with pre-existing tax distortions in the labor market.  When new regulations
drive up firm production costs and product prices they reduce the real household wage.  This
(slightly) reduces the overall quantity of labor supply.  Given the large wedge between gross
and net-of-tax wages, this reduction in labor supply can lead to efficiency losses that can be
sizeable relative to the partial equilibrium costs of the regulation.  On the other hand, there is
an offsetting effect if regulations raise government revenues (as pollution taxes and auctioned
pollution permits do) and this revenue is used to reduce distortionary taxes.6
In this paper we embed a simple "textbook" model of traffic congestion into a series of
general equilibrium models to illustrate how the existence of tax distortions in the labor
market crucially affects the overall welfare impacts of congestion taxes.  A key issue that
obviously crops up with congestion fees is what to do with the revenues that are raised.  Often
these revenues are earmarked for public transportation projects (this has been the practice in
Norway).  Alternatively, revenues can be used to improve economic efficiency by reducing
                                                
Holland in 2001.  Electronic pricing has been slower to catch on in the United States, but a notable example is
Route 91linking Riverside to Orange County in Southern California.  For more information about current and
planned road pricing schemes see the Toll Roads Newsletter.
5 For surveys of the literature on road pricing see for example Morrison (1986), Hau (1992), and Winston
(1985).  Newbery (1990) provides an overview of the relative importance of these second-best factors in
determining optimal road charges.  Some recent empirical studies of the welfare gains from congestion pricing
include Cameron (1994), Mohring and Anderson (1994) and Calthrop and Proost (1998).
6 For more discussion see e.g. Goulder et al. (1997) and Parry et al. (1999).  In a different context, Browning
(1997) estimated that the welfare costs of monopoly pricing in the United States are around ten times larger
when the impact of reduced production on exacerbating tax distortions in the labor market is taken into account.
It has long been recognized in the public finance literature that regulatory policies interact with the tax system
and this causes the general equilibrium welfare impact of these policies to differ from the partial equilibrium
effect (e.g. Harberger, 1974).  The contribution of the more recent literature is to demonstrate the potentially
substantial empirical magnitude of this welfare difference.  For a review of the literature, and its policy
implications, see for example Parry and Oates (1998).Parry and Bento  RFF 99-45
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the rates of other distortionary taxes in the economy.  Indeed, Harrington et al. (1998) find a
discernable reduction in public opposition to congestion fees if people expect to get back
some of the revenues in the form of other tax reductions.  We examine cases where
congestion tax revenues are used to reduce distortionary taxes and to provide subsidies for
public transit fares.  We also examine the standard textbook assumption that revenues are
returned to households in lump-sum transfers and hence do not directly affect economic
efficiency.  To our knowledge, ours is the first extensive comparison of these congestion
policies in a second-best setting with distortionary taxes.7
We find that, if the revenues from a tax on work-related traffic congestion are used to
reduce distortionary labor taxes, this tax shift typically reduces the deadweight costs of the tax
system by encouraging labor force participation at the margin, in addition to offsetting the
externality distortion from congestion.  The increase in labor supply arises because the
combination of reduced congestion and reduced labor taxes more than compensates
commuters (as a group) for the congestion fee, implying that the returns to work--net of taxes
and commuting costs--increase.8  The efficiency gains in the labor market can raise the
overall efficiency gains from the congestion tax by as much as 100 percent under a wide
range of assumptions about parameter values.
In sharp contrast, if congestion tax revenues are used to finance government transfer
payments instead of cutting labor taxes, the net impact of the congestion tax is to reduce
household wages net of taxes and commuting costs and discourage labor supply.  In most of
our simulations the resulting efficiency cost in the labor market more than offsets the entire
welfare gains from internalizing the congestion externality!  When congestion tax revenues
are used to finance public transit subsidies rather than labor tax cuts, the net impact on labor
supply can be positive, but is smaller.  In addition, this policy fails to optimally allocate
commuters among alternative transport modes. We find that these sources of inefficiency can
become relatively "large" at more substantial amounts of traffic reduction.
To sum up, the presence of pre-existing tax distortions, and the form of revenue
recycling, can crucially affect the magnitude of the welfare effect of road-pricing schemes.
                                               
7 In an earlier study Repetto et al. (1992) estimate that the welfare gains from recycling revenues in other tax
cuts can be substantial relative to the partial equilibrium welfare gain from imposing a set of Pigouvian taxes on
congested roads in the United States.  This study makes a valid point about the importance of revenue recycling.
However, since the study does not utilize a general equilibrium model it does not capture important interactions
between congestion taxes and pre-existing taxes in the labor market.  Mayeres and Proost (1997) analyze
congestion taxes as part of an optimal tax system, and Mayeres (1998) reports some simulation results on
congestion taxes from a computable general equilibrium model of the Belgian economy.  Our paper builds on
these earlier studies by considering more alternatives for revenue recycling and illustrating the welfare impacts
of policies across a wide range of values for key parameter values.
8 As discussed below, this result differs from that in a number of other recent studies of environmental taxes.
These studies find that the introduction of a pollution tax typically reduces labor supply, even when the revenues
are used to cut distortionary labor taxes.  In the present paper reducing the externality--congestion costs--induces
a feedback effect that partially mitigates the adverse impact of the congestion tax on labor supply, prior to
revenue recycling.  As a result of this feedback effect, the overall impact on labor supply can be positive when
revenues finance cuts in labor taxes.Parry and Bento  RFF 99-45
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In fact in many of our scenarios the form of revenue recycling determines whether the policy
produces a very substantial welfare gain, or whether the net impact is actually to reduce social
welfare.  In this connection, regulations that restrict how local governments could use revenues
from congestion taxes--such as those in Britain stipulating that such revenue sources must be
used for public transport--may significantly limit the potential efficiency gains from this policy.
Some important caveats are in order.  First, our objective is to illustrate the magnitude of
the spillover effect from congestion taxes in the labor market, relative to the efficiency gain
from internalizing the congestion externality.  For this purpose we abstract from a number of
practical complications that affect transportation systems.  For example, we use a static analysis
in which road capacity and the geographical location of firms and households are fixed.  We
ignore the complications posed by multiple congestion externalities, pollution and accident
externalities, and pre-existing transport policies such as gasoline taxes, vehicle fees, and
inefficient pricing of public transportation.  We also abstract from distributional considerations,
and sidestep the important public choice issue of how new revenue sources might actually be
used in practice, given the pressures for additional spending and tax relief from competing
interest groups.  Nonetheless, we believe that the key mechanisms highlighted in our analysis
would be at work in more general models.  Our analysis should be viewed as component that
might be usefully inserted into more comprehensive models of congestion taxes.9
Second, our analysis focuses only on weekday rush hour traffic congestion.  As we
discuss, there are notable examples of congestion caused by leisure activities (e.g. people
going to the beach).  In these cases congestion taxes would not reduce labor supply prior to
revenue recycling, though the (absolute) welfare gain from using the revenues to cut
distortionary taxes rather than finance lump-sum transfers would be the same as in our
analysis.  Third, in practice congestion tax revenues may be used for a variety of purposes
other than assumed in our analysis, such as providing more public goods or reducing local
sales or property taxes.  Below we comment on how our results might be affected by
alternative assumptions about revenue recycling.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  We begin in section 2 with an analytical
model that decomposes the general equilibrium welfare effects of alternative taxes on work-
related traffic congestion, in the presence of distortionary labor taxes.  Sections 3 and 4
describe and present simulation results on the welfare impacts of congestion taxes, using a
more detailed version of the analytical model that is solved numerically.  Section 5 concludes
and discusses limitations to the analysis.
                                               
9 Put another way, the general equilibrium welfare effects of congestion taxes can be decomposed into the
welfare gain from reducing the congestion externality, the welfare effect in the labor market, and additional
welfare effects due to interactions with pre-existing policies and other externalities within the transport system.
Our focus is purely on the labor market effects, and we believe that the size of these effects would not be greatly
affected by introducing pre-existing transit subsidies, gasoline taxes, pollution externalities, etc. into the analysis.Parry and Bento  RFF 99-45
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PIG intersect, the efficiency gain from incremental increases in labor supply exceeds the
incremental efficiency loss from the sub-optimal allocation among transport modes.
Figure 1
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(ii)   Total welfare effects
In Figure 1b we compare the total (as opposed to marginal) welfare impacts of
policies.  On the vertical axis we have the overall (general equilibrium) welfare gains under
alternative congestion taxes, expressed relative to the Pigouvian welfare gain (i.e. the welfare
gain from a congestion tax in the first-best version of model).
The top curve TW
TAX shows the relative welfare gain from the congestion tax when
revenues finance cuts in the distortionary labor tax.  This curve is roughly constant at about 2
implying that the induced welfare gains in the labor market are about equal to the Pigouvian
welfare gain.  In striking contrast TW
LST, the relative welfare impact under the congestion tax
with lump-sum replacement, is always below the horizontal axis.  In fact, reducing traffic by
the optimal Pigouvian amount (10 percent) would result in a net efficiency loss equal to
almost double the Pigouvian welfare gain!
The gap between TW
TAX and TW
LST reflects the efficiency gain from using congestion
tax revenues to cut distortionary taxes (rather than returning them lump sum).  At the Pigouvian19
Figure 2. Varying the demand 
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efficient than labor tax cuts at stimulating labor supply the less the average household
commutes to work by public transit.
Assuming the metro is publicly provided rather than privately provided has essentially
no effect on our results, if the metro continues to be priced at marginal cost (this change
essentially just raises the pre-existing labor tax from 38 to 39 percent).  However in practice
public transportation systems are typically priced at well below marginal cost (see e.g.
Dodgson and Topham, 1987).  Bringing in pre-existing public transit subsidies into our
analysis further reduces the efficiency loss from recycling congestion tax revenues in
(additional) public transit subsidies rather than labor tax reductions.  For example, when we
introduce a pre-existing public transit subsidy of 50 percent, the maximum welfare potential
of the congestion tax with revenues recycled in (additional) metro subsidies falls from 140
percent to just 40 percent of the Pigouvian welfare gains.
(iv)   Labor market parameters
In the second set of rows in Table 1 we vary the consumption/leisure elasticity to be
consistent with plausible ranges for labor supply elasticities.30  The more (less) responsive is
labor supply to changes in wages (net of taxes and commuting costs) the larger (smaller) are
the welfare impacts in the labor market relative to the Pigouvian welfare effect of congestion
taxes.  Our results show a modest amount of sensitivity to these elasticities.  But even under
conservative assumptions the welfare effect in the labor market is still important; for example,
assuming low values for labor supply elasticities, it still reduces the welfare potential of the
congestion tax with lump-sum replacement by 70 percent relative to the Pigouvian welfare
gain.31
In the final set of rows in Table 1 we vary the labor tax rate between 33 and 43 percent
(we consider this to be a plausible range).  This has a noticeable effect on our results--for
example the maximum welfare gain when congestion tax revenues finance labor tax cuts
varies between 168 and 222 percent of the Pigouvian welfare gain.  Even when the labor tax
rate is 33 percent however, the maximum welfare potential of the congestion tax with lump-
sum replacement is only trivially positive.  Note that the optimal traffic reduction under the
revenue-neutral congestion tax is not really affected by labor supply elasticities and labor tax
rates.  This is because the incremental change in labor supply, and hence incremental welfare
effect, becomes zero at the point when the congestion externality is fully internalized,
regardless of labor market parameters.
In short, these simulations demonstrate that two key results from our model are robust
to a wide range of values for transportation and labor market parameters.  These results are: a
                                               
30 The uncompensated labor supply elasticity varies between 0.05 and 0.30 and the compensated elasticity
varies between 0.20 and 0.50.
31 Note that a higher (lower) labor supply elasticity strengthens (weakens) both the Pigouvian welfare effect and
the labor market effect.  Thus, the ratio of these two effects is only moderately affected by changing labor supply
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tax shift off labor and onto work-related traffic congestion causes an overall welfare gain of
roughly double the Pigouvian gain from internalizing the externality; in contrast, a congestion
tax with lump-sum replacement may easily reduce overall welfare, despite the gains from
reducing congestion.  An intermediate case is when congestion tax revenues finance public
transit subsidies, but the relative welfare impact of this policy is highly sensitive to the
importance of the metro relative to other transport modes.
C.   Leisure-Related Travel
Most traffic congestion is associated with people going to and from work.  However
there are some notable examples of congestion at weekends caused by people going to the
beach, shopping malls, sports events, visiting relatives during holiday periods, and so on. In
response to congestion taxes associated with these activities people may respond by re-
scheduling these trips to other less busy times, or by substituting into other leisure activities
(e.g. spending more Saturdays gardening at home rather than going to the beach).  Possibly,
people might also end up working more days, but this effect is probably minimal.  At any rate,
the crucial point is that the congestion tax does not directly discourage labor supply, and
thereby avoids the efficiency loss in the labor market prior to revenue recycling.
Thus, in these cases a congestion tax with lump-sum replacement would induce a
general equilibrium welfare gain approximately equal to the Pigouvian welfare gain from
internalizing the externality.  If instead revenues were used to reduce labor taxes the general
equilibrium welfare gain would equal the Pigouvian welfare gain, plus an efficiency gain in
the labor market that roughly corresponds to the gap between TW
TAX and TW
LST in Figure 1(b).
That is, the optimal (revenue-neutral) Pigouvian congestion tax could induce an overall
efficiency gain of about 5 times the Pigouvian welfare gain.
More generally, some fraction of drivers on a congested road could be commuting to
work while the other drivers are involved in leisure pursuits.  It is straightforward to infer the
effects of a congestion tax in our analysis by taking the appropriate weighted-average of results
for the work-related and leisure-related cases.  For example, suppose two thirds of the drivers
in the rush hour are commuting to work while the remaining third are involved in leisure
activities.  Then the net welfare loss from a tax with lump-sum replacement that reduces traffic
by 10 percent in Figure 1(a) would fall from about 200 percent of the Pigouvian welfare effect
to about 100 percent.
5.   CONCLUSION
This paper uses analytical and numerical models to examine how pre-existing tax
distortions in the labor market affect the welfare impacts of road-pricing schemes, under
alternative assumptions about how the revenues raised are recycled.  For taxes imposed on
work-related traffic congestion, the net impact of a congestion tax with revenues returned
lump sum to households is to reduce labor supply in our analysis.  In fact under plausible
parameters the resulting efficiency loss in the labor market can more than offset the efficiencyParry and Bento  RFF 99-45
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gains from internalizing the congestion externality.  In contrast, the net impact of congestion
taxes is to stimulate labor supply if revenues are used to reduce labor taxes.  The resulting
efficiency improvement in the labor market about doubles the overall welfare gains from the
congestion tax.  Recycling the revenues in public transit subsidies rather than tax cuts is less
efficient, and the relative welfare discrepancy between these two policies is larger the greater
the amount of traffic reduction.  Taxes on traffic congestion associated with leisure (as
opposed to work) activities avoid the adverse impact on labor supply, prior to revenue
recycling.  Indeed when revenues are used to reduce labor taxes in our simulations the overall
efficiency gains can be several times the Pigouvian welfare gains.
The models presented above could be usefully extended in a number of different
directions.  First, we assume a static analysis where the existing capacity of the transport
system is taken as given.  It would be useful to explore how pre-existing tax distortions in
labor and capital markets might affect the optimal amount of investment in transportation
infrastructure over the long run.  In addition, our analysis does not capture the potentially
important long run efficiency impacts of congestion taxes brought about by induced changes
in the location decision of households and firms (see e.g. Arnott, 1999, for recent discussion
of these issues).
Second, we assume the congestion externality is the only source of pre-existing
distortion within the transportation sector.  In practice there might be a variety of other
sources of economic distortion that importantly influence the overall welfare impacts of a
congestion tax.  For example, distortions due to pollution externalities, accident and road
damage externalities, congestion externalities on alternative roads, or deviations from
marginal cost pricing in public transportation systems.  Furthermore, there are other markets
outside the transportation sector that contain pre-existing distortions besides the labor market.
For example, due to provisions in the tax system, certain markets, such as those for owner-
occupied housing and medical insurance, are heavily subsidized.  This means that the
efficiency gains from recycling revenues in labor tax reductions can include not only those in
the labor market, but also the efficiency gains from reducing distortionary subsidies for tax-
favored spending.  Results from other studies (Feldstein, 1999; Parry and Bento, 1998)
suggest that we may have significantly underestimated the welfare gains from revenue-neutral
congestion taxes.
Third, our focus is purely on the efficiency impacts of alternative congestion taxes.
Clearly, the manner in which congestion tax revenues might be recycled would have
important distributional consequences that affect the political feasibility of alternative policy
approaches.  Nonetheless, if for political or other reasons, congestion tax revenues are used
for purposes other than to cut distortionary taxes, this can be at a huge sacrifice in terms of
economic efficiency, and could even change the sign of the overall efficiency impact from
positive to negative.32
                                               
32 See Becker and Mulligan (1997) for some analysis of how governments may spend new revenue sources,
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Fourth, there are a variety of other policies that might be used, and are being used, to
reduce congestion in place of road pricing, such as parking fees, high occupancy vehicle
lanes, direct subsidies for public transport, and so on.  It would be useful to explore how pre-
existing tax distortions affect the efficiency properties of these other policy options.  Finally,
it might be useful in future analyses to allow for a more disaggregated treatment of the labor
market.  Our quantitative results are likely to change somewhat if the labor supply elasticity
of the group that benefits from the labor tax cut differs from the group of (actual and
potential) users of the transportation network.Parry and Bento  RFF 99-45
27
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